Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes)
Volume 26

Number 2

Article 19

1982

Panel Discussion: Commenting on Theodore Lowi's "Law, Power,
and Knowledge"
Francis A. Allen
University of Michigan Law School

Theodore J. St. Antoine
University of Michigan Law School

Joseph L. Sax
University of Michigan Law School

E. Philip Soper
University of Michigan

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes
Part of the Legal Education Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Legal Writing and
Research Commons

Recommended Citation
Francis A. Allen, Theodore J. St. Antoine, Joseph L. Sax & E. Philip Soper, Panel Discussion: Commenting
on Theodore Lowi's "Law, Power, and Knowledge", 26 Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes) (1982).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes/vol26/iss2/19

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes) by an authorized
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Panel Discussion:
Commenting on Theodore Lowi 's
"Law, Power, and Knowledge"

Participants:
Professors Francis A. Allen,
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Jos eph L.
Sax, and E. Philip Soper of the

University of Michigan Low School
Professor Sax: I think by suggesting
th e destruction of th e lega l profession, Professor Lowi is certainly going to generate some comments.
Professor Allen: Where in the Second Republic described by ~rofessor Lowi are th e concerns which we
were talking about yesterday?
Professor Sax: It seems to me that the
Lowi paper is of a piece wi(h m~ch
of what was said yesterday; 1t points
to an enormous proliferation of
intervention on the part of the
federal government and prolifera tion of administrative law.
Whereas some of the criticism
brought to that development yesterday was put on the level of i~~fficacy
of one kind or another, Low1 1s trying
to respond cri ticall y to those
developments at what one might call
the most elevated theoretical level.
He says that democratic gove:nment
now perceives itself as obliged to
respond positively to all the demands that are m ade on it. He said
today that at some point in the
development of the Second
Republic, government int ervention
changed from being m erely a nece~sary evil to a positive good . This
phenomenon of proliferating in volvement which he is pointing to is
what everybody was discussing
yesterday.
What to me is provocative and appealing is his notion that )a_w is_no
good unless it plays a leg1t1mating,
educative role . He eve n uses a term
lik e "civic virtue ," a ver oldfashioned one, but very revealing of
his views . In th e obfuscating model,
which he views as now being dominant , the fundamental goal of law,
this educative role. is lost.
In th e area that I know best , that is
in the environmenta l area, air pollution, water pollution , toxic substances and so forth, it seems to me
that la~s . for all th ei r complexit .
rea ll y are not models of obfuscation . They look much more like his
model civi l rights law. There is a
principle ; th e r e is a widesp:ea?
agreement in Congress on the pnnc1ple. So, I'm not sure , at least in the
area that I know, that the obfuscating model rea ll y is domin a nt.

Professor Lowi: My hypothesis is
that the level and intensity , and the
public character, of_ the politics in
the environmental field account for
the clarit y of the statutes. One has a
clearer sense of what the stakes are,
what the costs and gains would be .
I want to emphasize that the legal
integrity as I call it, the clarity of the
rule is only one criterion by which
to j~dge laws. The state laws in the
nineteenth century were clear; but a
lot of the state laws were so bad in
their purpose that I would definitely
have voted against them had I been
there . At least I would have known
what I was voting against.
Professor Allen: It occurs to me that
Professor Soper might have some
comments here. Do you have a sense
that the problems that we are talking
about are basically founded upon a
failure of legislators to do the job of
articulation and statement of
principle that the y should be doing?
Professor Soper: The only way that I
know to assess Professor Lowi's
claim about le al imprecision is ask
what other plausible explanations
there may be for such imprecision .
The most ·o bvious candidate , it seems
to me , alluded to b Professor Lowi
himself, is inherent complexity in
the subject matter , though Professor
Lowi denies that is the explanation.
If the subject matter is inherently
comple ·, I think, none of the theses
that Professor Lowi has advanced
can be demonstrated. Imprecision
will xist , regardless of whether it is
a case of delegation or statutory compromise through weakness or
through obfuscation . Nothing better
is to be expected , in fact much worse
is lik e! to occur. if we revert to the
situation of th e First Repub lic .
I think the way to demonstrate
these claims is to draw on exa mpl es
from more or less the same era that
Professor Lowi draws on . Jo e Sax has
already mentioned the primary example. the case of pollution control
legisl at ion . In the early 1970s
Congress passed legislation th at in

many respects fits exactly the
aspects of the Second Republic th_at
Professor Lowi decries . Congress virtually usurped the role previ~~sly
exe rcised by states and locaht1es,
and the legislation took both forms as
far as precision.
In some cases , Congress could not
have been more precise. In other
cases. Congress gave virtually unrestricted delegation to EPA to come
up with standards . In both cases the
process was the sam_e. There was
high visibility-I thmk Professor
Lowi himself suggested that was the
case-with effec ti ve interest groups
moving from the administrative
agency to court, to _Congress , . and
back again, extending deadlines ,
changing standards, fine tuning the
process as they gained information
about what was technologically
feasible .
The result may be a fourth kind of
co mpromise : compromise by experiment that recognizes the inherent
complexity in two senses. First, it
recognizes that the problem of
enviro nmental regulation transcends jurisdictional boundaries of
states and localities, so it requires
broader attention . Second , it admits
that even when approached from the
right geographical perspective, regulating pollution is complicated by uncertainty about the scientific effects
of pollutants and the costs and _feasibility of control. When that 1s the
case. there may be some sense in
starting to get the information we
need , either administratively or
legislatively , and then responding. If
that is true. if complexity makes a
difference, then one has to fine tune
the analysis and ask questions like,
"What matters are inherently complex and might be appropriate for
Second Republic treatment?"
Consider Professor Lowi's two examples : the Civil Rights Act and the
Economic Stabilization Act. The first
is a better kind of legislation , Professor Lowi suggests, than the second. Is
that because the first, the Civil
Rights Act , involves moral issues
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which, however divisive, are not factually complex in the way that questions about pollutant effects might
be? Regarding the other example,
I'm not nearly as confident as Professor Lowi that the effects of wage and
price controls are sufficiently certain, scientifically and factually, not
to justify some experiment before
we make a definite decision. If that's
the case, then one needs to fine tune
the question of when it is and is not
appropriate to use new devices like
delegation and vague legislation.
Professor Lowi: As far as environmental control is concerned, I don't
have full details of the politics of the
various efforts in that area, but I am
aware that the broad EPA structure
was set up by presidential order
more than by Congress. I don't call
that nearly as visible as the first
strikes at air pollution which were
rather specific. So my theory would
be that as the legislation became
more vague, the politics also became
less visible and· less centered in
Congress.
There's a point on which I would
like to agree with Professor Soper. It
may be that legislation is a way of
getting the information that we need.
I don't call it compromise by experiment; but whatever you call it, learning from experience is extremely
desirable. One of the great problems
with broad delegations is that they
make it more difficult to learn by experiment. One of the advantages of
federalism was that you could
experiment with one state trying
something one way, one state trying
it another, and a few states not trying
it at all, and see which ones work
out. The more vague is our principle
of action, the less basis we have for a
kind of controlled experiment from
which we can learn. The more vague
the first assertion is, the less likely it
is that Congress and the agencies
will learn by the experience.
Professor Allen: The question of the
use of law for purposes of the education of the republic looms very large
in this paper. Of the lawyer
members of this panel, Ted St. Antoine has probably been in a better
position than any of us to react to the
assertion that one of the losses in the
Second Republic is this educational
function of law. Ted has been a
Washington lawyer; he has had as a
client one of the principal interest
groups, the labor unions. What is
your reaction, Ted?
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Professor St. Antoine: I would like to
start off with a personal word of
thanks for Professor Lowi's contributing a rare intellectual gift,
namely, some new ideas. The Second Republic is a very provocative
concept. Provocative is sometimes an
academic euphemism for wrong, but
in any event he has stirred us up. As
we have discovered, however, any
bold, new, imaginatively designed
structure has a certain tendency to
leak. I would like to draw attention
to what I believe are some of the
leaks in the Lowi thesis.
I find pervading Professor Lowi's
presentation a kind of wistful yearning for an earlier and simpler
America. He and I probably both
come from small towns. I certainly
do, up in Vermont. The town meeting
is a wonderful way to run a society.
It is personal, it is intimate, and also
extraordinarily exclusive. Lowi
referred to the nineteenth century as
the "golden age of democracy." During that golden age of democracy,
women could not vote. During twothirds of that golden age of
democracy, blacks weren't citizens. I
realize that Lowi is not in favor of
denying either women the right to
vote or blacks the right to be citizens.
He would say that it's the process,
the bubbling up from below, that he
likes about the golden age of
democracy, but it seems to me that
the number of people that you let
into the process has an enormous
bearing on how that process is going
to work.
I think Professor Lowi is unhappy
about the muss of letting the masses
into the process. It's going to be a
devil of a lot harder to govern New
York City than to govern the Union
League. Where you have many conflicting interests, the process does
have to take account of compromise
that may not be all that pretty.
I will try to say something about
Professor Allen's question, concentrating upon the three specific
examples that Professor Lowi gave
us. The Water Resources Development Act of 1974, a part of the new
republic, is, as far as I see, nothing
but a modern extension of the land
giveaway, or subsidy programs, that
Lowi said typified congressional
legislation in the nineteenth century
when Congress was doing what it
was supposed to do, not dealing with
the great social issues of the times.
The Economic Stabilization Act of
1970 I regard as an aberrational
piece of legislation. Historically, I

think you'll find it was an effort by a
Democratic Congress to embarrass
an unpopular President of the
United States by giving him enormous powers, and daring him to do
something to solve our wage and
price problems. I do not think it was
a serious piece of legislation. It
didn't last. It's gone.
To pick that out as an example is to
concentrate upon the aberrational
instead of the typical. Much more
typical in my field is the Civil Rights
Act, which he dealt with, and it isn't
alone. The amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act have
become increasingly clear and
precise, even if misguided. I would
also cite the Landrum-Griffin Act,
dealing with internal union affairs,
the Fair Labor Standards Act amendments, the Pension Reform Act, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act,
the Social Security Act, and that
monument of specificity, if perhaps
nonsense, the Internal Revenue
Code. Congress has had full debate
and direct confrontation again and
again during the modern era. I really
don't understand the concern about
the lack of standards where standards are feasible.
In the National Labor Relations
Act, one will find both kinds of approaches. You 'II find i't staled in very
general terms that employers should
not coerce employees, that unions
should not coerce employees. That is
a delegation to an administrative
agency to fill in many blanks. I
would agree with Phil Soper that this
is really of the nature of the problem
and that there must be generalization. A sense of direction is
provided, but Congress had no sense
of the infinite variety of ways in
which employers and unions with
imaginative lawyers can coerce
employees. Other sections state that
employers can't bribe union officials
and give a long list of specifically
stated exceptions.
When you are dealing with a
society as diverse as ours, when you
are opening the doors to all kinds of
different individuals, highly diverse
individuals, individuals who will not
meet over cocktails at the Union
League to resolve their problems
quietly, interest groups are the way
the system has got to work. If there's
any educative lesson in all of this, it
is the lesson that the law is
responding to the way the real world
is and to a far more open society than
the golden age of the nineteenth century.

Professor Lowi: How can I respond
to a set of comments that are so popular with the audience? I'm not
against women or blacks being in the
system. The golden age to me was the
golden age of legislative democracy,
and I have a feeling that if blacks,
women, and others had been admitted to membership, the legislature
could have worked just as well. I
don't like the idea of blaming whatever ills we have today on the inclusion of new people.
I agree here and in print that there
are elements of labor legislation that
would stand up better than others as
clear principles; but is it easy to confuse specificity with a clear rule. The
Internal Revenue Code is an example. While it is highly specific, ii
lacks unifying principles. We've got
to make a lot more distinctions in
types of law, so we can set up experiments and do research on whether
different kinds of politics, the more
public or more private kinds of
politics, flow from different kinds of
legislation. Then we would have a
good discourse going between the
political scientist and the lawyer.
Professor Sax: It seems to me Professor Lowi is arguing that a law that is
infinitely detailed can have exactly
the same problems as a law that is utterly empty: no identifiable center or
principle.
I think what Phil Soper said is
more troublesome in terms of the
Lowi paper. If, as he says, these laws
are really experiments, that suggests the whole enterprise is a kind
of bureaucratic technological function. It suggests that legislation is
designed to find out the answers to
some very detailed questions and
that these answers will tell you automatically what to do. That is a really
technological view of law. It seems to
me the centerpiece of what Lowi
says is that the law has got to have
some clarity about what basic resolution has been made of important
kinds of value conflict.
Professor Lowi: To project or defend
or rationalize an act of authority as
an experiment is a way of seriously
reducing its legitimacy, almost a way
of undercutting the very experiment
itself. If everybody knows a law is an
experiment, they may very well say,
"No one will seriously punish us for
disobeying this." If you state that a
law is an experiment, you may very
well undercut the purpose and wind
up with a false experiment.

Professor Soper: Federalism was a
way of experimentation, and nobody
thought that was bad. If complexity
includes an explanation for why we
can no longer treat the subjects locally rather than nationally, then we
simply ....
Professor Lowi: Theorists of federalism said different experiences
would be a form of experiment, but
you cannot find in the literature a
state defending an important state
statute as experimental. Theorists of
federalism said that federalism was
a great laboratory, not the legislators themselves.
Professor St. Antoine: Professor
Lowi, I'm having some trouble
finding out exactly what are the distinctions between your First and Second Republic, and whether you
think that there are advantages in
the approach of the First Republic.
You said that really suffrage was not
your thesis here, and I am certainly
prepared to say that you are not opposed to women's voting or blacks
being citizens. Nonetheless, you did
state that when we had a model
democracy, the party leaders controlled the state legislatures of the
East, and big corporations controlled the state legislatures of the
West. I find that very troubling as a
characterization of a golden age of
democracy.
You have also made the point that
recently Congress, in working out
law, has produced policy without
law. Now the Internal Revenue Code
may be blamed for being law without policy, but that's not the same
thing. I suppose you would say the
ideal is to have both law and policy
reflected in clear edicts. I guess we
can all agree on that ideal. My concern is that when we do have as
widespread a system of participation in government as we now
have, with many different interest
groups genuinely reflecting the interests of many different groups of
people,
a clear univocal articulation of principle is, by the very
nature of our present form of
democracy, often impossible.
Finally, answering Professor Allen's question, I think we have
chosen against any kind of authoritarian educative function of law by
the kind of system we have installed.
Ideally, I might prefer a simpler and
clearer, more authoritative and more
univocal policy, but it seems to me
that we have sacrificed that in order
to let more persons of widely varying
views participate meaningfully in
the political process.

Professor Lowi: Those ideas are all
very interesting. I just want to touch
on a couple of them. One, I'm an expatriate southerner, and I don't
yearn for anything of the nineteenth
century past. Second, you're absolutely right that pork barrelling is
all they did in the nineteenth century. I say the same thing. It's just
that the national government didn't
quit doing that when ii became a
Second Republic. A very large portion of the budget is pork barrel1in g- public works, internal
improvements.
The secret of the stability of the
national government in the
nineteenth century was that pork
barrel legislation was all it did. Only
when it took on all these new functions did it become unstable, unsteady, and ridden by interest
groups.
Interest groups have always been
part of American politics, but in the
nineteenth century there were
media ting ins ti tu tions, parties and
legislatures that routinely forced
special interests to amalgamate to
form a coalition as the only basis for
getting enough votes to pass a law.
The Second Republic lacks those
institutions that would intervene in a
mediating way. You cannot talk
about interest groups as though they
are something new. You cannot even
talk about single-issue interest
groups as new. You can simply talk
about a changed institutional and
constitutional environment in which
they operate.
One doesn't have to be antidemocracy to say that interest groups
under certain circumstances can
become harmful. That is not to argue
that we should go back to the
nineteenth century. I want to go ·
forward to something that we don't
yet have, while learning something
from the nineteenth century. The ,
one thing I would look to in the ,
"Third Republic" is the revival of
the mediating institutions of party
and legislature.
1

This transcription of the Panel Discussion was prepared by the editor
from a tape recording of the
proceedings.
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